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Mean-Variance Optimal Portfolios in the Presence of a Benchmark with Applications to Fraud Detection

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▶ Part 1: Mean-Variance efficient payoffs

- Optimal payoffs when you only care about mean and variance
- Payoffs with maximal possible Sharpe ratio
- Application to fraud detection

▶ Part 2: Constrained Mean-Variance efficient payoffs

- Drawbacks of traditional mean-variance efficient payoffs
- Optimal payoffs in presence of a random benchmark
- Sharpening the maximal possible Sharpe ratios
- Application to improved fraud detection

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- The market (Ω, F, P) is arbitrage-free.
- ▶ There is a risk-free account earning r > 0.
- Consider a strategy with payoff X_T at time T > 0.
- \blacktriangleright There exists ${\mathbb Q}$ so that its initial price writes as

$$c(X_T)=e^{-rT}\mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}}\left[X_T\right],$$

 \blacktriangleright Equivalently, there exists a stochastic discount factor ξ_{T} such that

$$c(X_T) = \mathbb{E}_P \left[\xi_T X_T \right].$$

• Assume ξ_T is continuously distributed and $var(\xi_T) < \infty$.



Mean Variance Optimization

► A Mean-Variance efficient problem:

$$\mathcal{P}_{1}) \qquad \begin{array}{l} \max_{X_{\mathcal{T}}} \mathbb{E}\left[X_{\mathcal{T}}\right] \\ \text{subject to} \quad \begin{cases} \mathbb{E}\left[\xi_{\mathcal{T}}X_{\mathcal{T}}\right] = W_{0} \\ \text{var}[X_{\mathcal{T}}] = s^{2} \end{cases}$$

Proposition (Mean-variance efficient portfolios)

Let $W_0 > 0$ denote the initial wealth and assume the investor aims for a strategy that maximizes the expected return for a given variance s^2 for $s \ge 0$. The a.s. unique solution to (\mathcal{P}_1) writes as

$$X_T^{\star} = a - b\xi_T,$$

where
$$a = (W_0 + b\mathbb{E}[\xi_T^2]) e^{rT} \ge 0$$
, $b = \frac{s}{\sqrt{var(\xi_T)}} \ge 0$.

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Choose a and $b \ge 0$ such that $X_T^{\star} = a - b\xi_T$ satisfies the constraints $var(X_T^{\star}) = s^2$ and $c(X_T^{\star}) = W_0$.

Observe that $\operatorname{corr}(X_T^{\star}, \xi_T) = -1$ and X_T^{\star} is thus the unique payoff that is perfectly negatively correlated with ξ_T while satisfying the variance and cost constraints.

Consider any other strategy X_T which also verifies these constraints (but is not negatively linear in ξ_T). We find that

$$\operatorname{corr}(X_{T},\xi_{T}) = \frac{\mathbb{E}[\xi_{T}X_{T}] - \mathbb{E}[\xi_{T}]\mathbb{E}[X_{T}]}{\sqrt{\operatorname{var}(\xi_{T})}} > -1 = \operatorname{corr}(X_{T}^{*},\xi_{T}).$$

Since $var(X_T) = s^2 = var(X_T^*)$ and $\mathbb{E}[\xi_T X_T] = W_0 = \mathbb{E}[\xi_T X_T^*]$ it follows that

 $\mathbb{E}[\xi_T]\mathbb{E}[X_T] < \mathbb{E}[\xi_T]\mathbb{E}[X_T^\star],$

which shows that X_T^* maximizes the expectation and thus solves Problem (\mathcal{P}_1).

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Consider any other strategy X_T which also verifies these constraints (but is not negatively linear in ξ_T). We find that

$$\operatorname{corr}(X_{\mathcal{T}},\xi_{\mathcal{T}}) = \frac{\mathbb{E}[\xi_{\mathcal{T}}X_{\mathcal{T}}] - \mathbb{E}[\xi_{\mathcal{T}}]\mathbb{E}[X_{\mathcal{T}}]}{\sqrt{\operatorname{var}(\xi_{\mathcal{T}})}\sqrt{\operatorname{var}(X_{\mathcal{T}})}} > -1 = \operatorname{corr}(X_{\mathcal{T}}^{\star},\xi_{\mathcal{T}}).$$

Since $\operatorname{var}(X_T) = s^2 = \operatorname{var}(X_T^*)$ and $\mathbb{E}[\xi_T X_T] = W_0 = \mathbb{E}[\xi_T X_T^*]$ it follows that

$$\mathbb{E}[\xi_T]\mathbb{E}[X_T] < \mathbb{E}[\xi_T]\mathbb{E}[X_T^\star],$$

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Maximum Sharpe Ratio

▶ The Sharpe Ratio (SR) of a payoff X_T (terminal wealth at T when investing W_0 at t = 0) is defined as

$$SR(X_T) = rac{\mathbb{E}[X_T] - W_0 e^{rT}}{\operatorname{std}(X_T)},$$

 \Rightarrow All mean-variance efficient portfolios X_T^{\star} have the same maximal Sharpe Ratio (SR^{*}) given by

$$SR^{\star} := SR(X_T^{\star}) = e^{rT} \operatorname{std}(\xi_T),$$

For all portfolios X_T we have

$$SR(X_T) \leqslant e^{rT} \operatorname{std}(\xi_T),$$

▶ This can be used to show Madoff's investment strategy was a fraud (Bernard & Boyle (2007)).

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Example in a Black-Scholes market

▶ There is a risk-free rate r > 0 and a risky asset with price process,

$$\frac{dS_t}{S_t} = \mu dt + \sigma dW_t,$$

where W_t is a standard Brownian motion, μ is the drift and σ is the volatility.

▶ The state-price density ξ_T is given as

$$\xi_{T} = e^{-rT} e^{-\theta W_{T} - \frac{1}{2}\theta^{2}T} = \alpha S_{T}^{-\beta},$$

for known coefficients $\alpha, \beta > 0$ (assume $\mu > r$ and $\theta = \frac{\mu - r}{\sigma}$). The maximal Sharpe ratio is given by

$$SR^{\star} = \sqrt{e^{\theta^2 T} - 1}.$$

see Goetzmann et al. (2007) for another proof.

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Non-parametric estimation of the upper bound

 e^{rT} std (ξ_T)

► Assume \$\xi_T = f(S_T)\$ (where f is typically decreasing and \$\xi_T\$ is the risky asset) and that all European call options on the underlying \$\xi_T\$ maturing at \$T > 0\$ are traded. Let \$C(K)\$ denote the price of a call option on \$\xi_T\$ with strike \$K\$. Then, the Sharpe ratio \$SR(\$\X_T\$)\$ of any admissible strategy with payoff \$\X_T\$ satisfies

$$SR(X_T) \leqslant \sqrt{e^{2rT} \int_0^{+\infty} f(K) \frac{\partial^2 C(K)}{\partial K^2} dK - 1}$$

use for instance Aït-Sahalia and Lo (2001).

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Improving Fraud Detection by Adding Constraints

- Detect fraud based on mean and variance only
- Ignored so far additional information available in the market.
- ► How to take into account the dependence features between the investment strategy and the financial market?
- Include correlations of the fund with market indices to refine fraud detection.

Ex: the so-called "market-neutral" strategy is typically designed to have very low correlation with market indices \Rightarrow it reduces the maximum possible Sharpe ratio!

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Improving Investment by Adding Constraints

> Optimal strategies X^{*}_T = a − bξ_T give their lowest outcomes when ξ_T is high. Bounded gains but unlimited losses!
 > Highest state-prices ξ_T(ω) correspond to states ω of bad economic conditions as these are more expensive to insure:

• E.g. in a Black-Scholes market: $\xi_T = \alpha S_T^{-\beta}$, $\alpha, \beta > 0$.

- Also, E[X_T^{*}|ξ_T > c] < E[Y_T|ξ_T > c], for any other strategy Y_T with the same distribution as X_T^{*} showing that X_T^{*} does not provide protection against crisis situations (event "ξ_T > c").
- in a Black-Scholes market: $X_T^* = -\infty$ when $S_T = 0$.

► To cope with this observation: we impose the strategy to have some desired dependence with ξ_T , or more generally with a benchmark B_T .

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Proposition (Optimal portfolio with a correlation constraint)

Let B_T be a benchmark, linearly independent from ξ_T with $0 < var(B_T) < +\infty$. Let $|\rho| < 1$ and s > 0. A solution to the following mean-variance optimization problem

is given by $X_T^{\star} = a - b(\xi_T - cB_T)$, where a, b and c are uniquely determined by the set of equations

$$\rho = corr(cB_T - \xi_T, B_T)$$

$$s = b\sqrt{var(\xi_T - cB_T)}$$

$$W_0 = ae^{-rT} - b(E[\xi_T^2] - cE[\xi_T B_T]).$$

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Observe that $f(c) := \operatorname{corr}(cB_T - \xi_T, B_T)$ verifies $\lim_{c \to -\infty} f(c) = -1$, $\lim_{c \to +\infty} f(c) = 1$ and f'(c) > 0 so that $\rho = f(c)$ has a unique solution. Take $X_T^* = a - b(\xi_T - cB_T)$ linear in $\xi_T - cB_T$ and satisfying all constraints and b > 0. Consider any other X_T that satisfies the constraints and which is

non-linear in $\xi_T - cB_T$, then

$$\operatorname{corr}(X_{T},\xi_{T}-cB_{T}) = \frac{\mathbb{E}[X_{T}(\xi_{T}-cB_{T})] - \mathbb{E}[\xi_{T}-cB_{T}]\mathbb{E}[X_{T}]}{\operatorname{std}(\xi_{T}-cB_{T})\operatorname{std}(X_{T})}$$
$$> -1 = \operatorname{corr}(X_{T}^{\star},\xi_{T}-cB_{T})$$

Since both X_T and X_T^* satisfy the constraints we have that $\operatorname{std}(X_T) = \operatorname{std}(X_T^*), \mathbb{E}[X_T\xi_T] = \mathbb{E}[X_T^*\xi_T]$ and $\operatorname{cov}(X_T, B_T) = \operatorname{cov}(X_T^*, B_T)$. Hence the inequality holds true if and only if $\mathbb{E}[X_T^*] > \mathbb{E}[X_T]$.

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$$\operatorname{corr}(X_T, \xi_T - cB_T) = \frac{\mathbb{E}[X_T(\xi_T - cB_T)] - \mathbb{E}[\xi_T - cB_T]\mathbb{E}[X_T]}{\operatorname{std}(\xi_T - cB_T)\operatorname{std}(X_T)}$$
$$> -1 = \operatorname{corr}(X_T^{\star}, \xi_T - cB_T)$$

Since both X_T and X_T^* satisfy the constraints we have that $\operatorname{std}(X_T) = \operatorname{std}(X_T^*), \mathbb{E}[X_T\xi_T] = \mathbb{E}[X_T^*\xi_T]$ and $\operatorname{cov}(X_T, B_T) = \operatorname{cov}(X_T^*, B_T)$. Hence the inequality holds true if and only if $\mathbb{E}[X_T^*] > \mathbb{E}[X_T]$.

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	$S_{ au}^{\star}$: G	rowth	Optima	l Port	folio	(GOP)	

- The Growth Optimal Portfolio (GOP) maximizes expected logarithmic utility from terminal wealth.
- It has the property that it almost surely accumulates more wealth than any other strictly positive portfolios after a sufficiently long time.
- Under general assumptions on the market, the GOP is a diversified portfolio (proxy: a world stock index).
- The GOP can be used as numéraire to price under P, so that $\xi_T = \frac{1}{S_T^*}$

$$c(X_T) = E_P \left[\xi_T X_T\right] = E_P \left[\frac{X_T}{S_T^*}\right]$$

where $S_0^{\star} = 1$.

• Details in Platen & Heath (2006).

The optimal solution is of the form $X_T^{\star} = a - b(\xi_T - cS_{T/2}^{\star})$, where *c* is computed from the equation $\rho = \operatorname{corr}(cS_{T/2}^{\star} - \xi_T, S_{T/2}^{\star})$, *b* is derived from $b = \frac{s}{\sqrt{\operatorname{var}(\xi_T - cS_{T/2}^{\star})}}$ and $a = W_0 e^{rT} + b\left(e^{-2rT + \theta^2 T} - c\mathbb{E}[\xi_T S_{T/2}^{\star}]\right)e^{rT}$.

Optimal payoffs as a function of the GOP for a given correlation level $\rho = -0.5$ with the benchmark $S_{T/2}^{\star}$ using the following parameters: $W_0 = 100$, r = 0.05, $\mu = 0.07$, $\sigma = 0.2$, T = 1, $S_0 = 100$, s = 10.



An optimal solution is of the form $X_T^{\star} = a - b(\xi_T - cS_T^{\star})$, where c is computed from the equation $\rho = \operatorname{corr}(cS_T^{\star} - \xi_T, S_T^{\star})$, b is derived from $b = \frac{s}{\sqrt{\operatorname{var}(\xi_T - cS_T^{\star})}}$ and $a = W_0 e^{rT} + b\left(e^{-2rT + \theta^2 T} - c\right)e^{rT}$.

Optimal payoffs as a function of the GOP for different values of the correlation ρ with the benchmark S_T^{\star} using the following parameters: $W_0 = 100$, r = 0.05, $\mu = 0.07$, $\sigma = 0.2$, T = 1, $\theta = (\mu - r)/\sigma$, $S_0 = 100$, s = 10.



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Proposition (Constrained Maximal Sharpe Ratio)

All mean-variance efficient portfolios X_T^* which satisfy the additional constraint corr $(X_T^*, B_T) = \rho$ with a benchmark asset B_T (that is not linearly dependent to ξ_T) have the same maximal Sharpe ratio SR_{ρ}^* given by

$$SR_{\rho}^{\star} = e^{rT} \frac{cov(\xi_{T}, \xi_{T} - cB_{T})}{std(\xi_{T} - cB_{T})} \leqslant SR^{\star} = e^{rT} std(\xi_{T}).$$
(2)

where SR^* is the unconstrained Sharpe ratio.

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Illustration in the Black-Scholes model

Maximum Sharpe ratio SR_{ρ}^{\star} for different values of the correlation ρ when the benchmark is $B_T = S_T^{\star}$. We use the following parameters: $W_0 = 100$, r = 0.05, $\mu = 0.07$, $\sigma = 0.2$, T = 1, $S_0 = 100$.

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M-V Optimization with a Benchmark

▶ Dependence (interaction) between X_T and B_T cannot be fully reflected by correlation.

▶ A useful device to do so is the copula. Sklar's theorem shows that the joint distribution of (B_T, X_T) can be decomposed as

$$P(B_{T} \leq y, X_{T} \leq x) = C(F_{B_{T}}(y), F_{X_{T}}(x)),$$

where C is the joint distribution (also called the copula) for a pair of uniform random variables over (0, 1). Hence, the copula C fully describes the interaction between the strategy's payoff X_T and the benchmark B_T .

► Constrained Mean-Variance efficient problem:

$$(\mathcal{P}_3) \qquad \begin{array}{l} \max_{X_T} \mathbb{E}[X_T] \\ \text{subject to} \\ \end{bmatrix} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \mathbb{E}[\xi_T X_T] = W_0 \\ \operatorname{var}(X_T) = s^2 \\ C := \operatorname{Copula}(X_T, B_T) \end{array} \right.$$

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Proposition (Optimal portfolio when $B_T = \xi_T$)

Let W_0 denote the initial wealth and let $B_T = \xi_T$. Define the variable \mathcal{A}_t as

$$\mathcal{A}_t = \left(c_{\mathcal{F}_{\xi_T}(\xi_T)}\right)^{-1} \left[j_{\mathcal{F}_{\xi_T}(\xi_T)}(\mathcal{F}_{\xi_t}(\xi_t))\right],$$

where the functions $j_u(v)$ and $c_u(v)$ are defined as the first partial derivative for $(u, v) \rightarrow J(u, v)$ and $(u, v) \rightarrow C(u, v)$ respectively, and where J denotes the copula for the random pair (ξ_T, ξ_t) . Assume that $\mathbb{E}[\xi_T | A_t]$ is decreasing in A_t . For s > 0, a solution to (\mathcal{P}_3) is given by X_T^* ,

$$X_T^{\star} = a - b\mathbb{E}[\xi_T | \mathcal{A}_t], \tag{3}$$

where $a = (W_0 + b\mathbb{E}[\xi_T \mathbb{E}[\xi_T | \mathcal{A}_t]]) e^{rT}$, $b = \frac{s}{std(\mathbb{E}[\xi_T | \mathcal{A}_t])}$.

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- \triangleright C a copula between 2 uniform U and V over [0, 1]
- ► c_u(v) := ∂/∂u C(u, v) can be interpreted as a conditional probability:

$$c_u(v) = \mathbb{P}(V \leqslant v | U = u). \tag{4}$$

- ▶ $c_U(V)$ is a uniform variable that depends on U and V and which is independent of U.
- If U and T are independent uniform random variables then c_U⁻¹(T) is a uniform variable (depending on U and T) that has copula C with U.
- ► The following variable is a Uniform over [0,1] with the right dependence with ξ_T for 0 < t < T</p>

$$\mathcal{A}_t = \left(c_{F_{\xi_T}(\xi_T)}\right)^{-1} \left[j_{F_{\xi_T}(\xi_T)}(F_{\xi_t}(\xi_t))\right],$$

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▶ The optimal X_T , if it exists, can always be written as $X_T = f(U)$ for some f increasing in some standard uniform U having the right copula with B_T .

• \mathcal{A}_t is a good candidate for U.

▶ Choose *a* and $b \ge 0$ such that $X_T^* = a - b\mathbb{E}[\xi_T | A_t]$ satisfies the constraints of Problem (\mathcal{P}_3) that is *a* and *b* verify $var(X_T^*) = s^2$ and $c(X_T^*) = W_0$.

► X_T^* has the right copula with ξ_T (because of the monotonicity constraint).

▶ corr $(X_T^{\star}, \mathbb{E}[\xi_T | \mathcal{A}_t]) = -1$ and X_T^{\star} is thus the unique payoff that is perfectly negatively correlated with $\mathbb{E}[\xi_T | \mathcal{A}_t]$ and also satisfying all the constraints of Problem (\mathcal{P}_3) .

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▶ Consider next any other strategy X_T which also verifies these constraints. We find that

$$\operatorname{corr}(X_{\mathcal{T}}, \mathbb{E}[\xi_{\mathcal{T}}|\mathcal{A}_t]) = \frac{\mathbb{E}[\mathbb{E}[\xi_{\mathcal{T}}|\mathcal{A}_t]X_{\mathcal{T}}] - \mathbb{E}[\xi_{\mathcal{T}}]\mathbb{E}[X_{\mathcal{T}}]}{\sqrt{\operatorname{var}(\mathbb{E}[\xi_{\mathcal{T}}|\mathcal{A}_t])}\sqrt{\operatorname{var}(X_{\mathcal{T}})}} \\ > -1 = \operatorname{corr}(X_{\mathcal{T}}^{\star}, \mathbb{E}[\xi_{\mathcal{T}}|\mathcal{A}_t]).$$

Since X_T satisfies the constraints of (\mathcal{P}_3) , we have that $\operatorname{var}(X_T) = s^2 = \operatorname{var}(X_T^*)$ and $\mathbb{E}[\xi_T X_T] = \mathbb{E}[\mathbb{E}[\xi_T | \mathcal{A}_t] X_T] = W_0 = \mathbb{E}[\xi_T X_T^*]$. Therefore

$$\mathbb{E}[\xi_T]\mathbb{E}[X_T] < \mathbb{E}[\xi_T]\mathbb{E}[X_T^*],$$

which shows that X_T^{\star} maximizes the expectation.

Proposition (Constrained Mean-Variance Efficiency)

M-V Efficiency

Let s > 0. Assume that the benchmark B_T has a joint density with ξ_T . Define \mathcal{A} as $\mathcal{A} = \left(c_{F_{B_T}(B_T)}\right)^{-1} \left[j_{F_{B_T}(B_T)}(1 - F_{\xi_T}(\xi_T))\right]$, where the functions $j_u(v)$ and $c_u(v)$ are defined as the first partial derivative for $(u, v) \rightarrow J(u, v)$ and $(u, v) \rightarrow C(u, v)$ respectively, and where J denotes the copula for the random pair (B_T, ξ_T) . If $\mathbb{E}[\xi_T|\mathcal{A}]$ is decreasing in \mathcal{A} , then the solution to the problem

$$\max_{\substack{var(X_T) = s^2 \\ c(X_T) = W_0 \\ C : copula between X_T and B_T}} \mathbb{E}[X_T]$$
(5)

Copula

is uniquely given as $X_T^{\star} = a - b\mathbb{E}[\xi_T | \mathcal{A}]$ where a, b are non-negative and can be computed explicitly.

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In the paper we apply this to Black-Scholes markets.
 All portfolios with copula C with B_T must now have a Sharpe Ratio bounded by

 $e^{r^{T}}$ std[$\mathbb{E}[\xi_{T}|\mathcal{A}]$], $\left(\leq e^{r^{T}}$ std[ξ_{T}] $\right)$.

► In the paper we use these results to develop improved fraud detection schemes.

Proposition (Case $B_T = S_t^{\star}$)

Let W_0 denote the initial wealth and let $B_T = S_t^*$ (0 < t < T) be the benchmark. Assume that $\rho \ge -\sqrt{1 - \frac{t}{T}}$. Then, the solution to (\mathcal{P}_3) when the copula C is the Gaussian copula with correlation ρ , C_{ρ}^{Gauss} is given by X_T^* ,

$$X_T^{\star} = a - bG_T^c. \tag{6}$$

Here G_T is a weighted average of the benchmark and the GOP. It is given as $G_T = (S_t^*)^{\alpha} S_T^*$ with α ,

$$\alpha = \rho \sqrt{\frac{T-t}{t} \frac{1}{1-\rho^2}} - 1.$$

Furthermore $a = W_0 e^{rT} + b e^{rT} \mathbb{E}[\xi_T G_T^c], b = \frac{s}{\sqrt{var(G_T^c)}}, c = -\frac{\alpha t + T}{(\alpha + 1)^2 t + (T - t)}.$

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▶ Maximum Sharpe ratio $SR_{\rho,G}^{\star}$ for different values of the correlation ρ when the benchmark is $B_T = S_t^{\star}$. We use the following parameters: t = 1/3, $\sqrt{t/T} = 0.577$, $-\sqrt{1-t/T} = -0.816$, $W_0 = 100$, r = 0.05, $\mu = 0.07$, $\sigma = 0.2$, T = 1, $S_0 = 100$.

▶ Observe that the constrained case reduces to the unconstrained maximum Sharpe ratio when the correlation in the Gaussian copula is $\rho = \sqrt{t/T}$. The reason is that the copula between the unconstrained optimum and S_t^* is the Gaussian copula with correlation $\rho = \sqrt{t/T}$. The constraint is thus redundant in that case.

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- Mean-variance efficient portfolios when there are no trading constraints
- Mean-variance efficiency with a stochastic benchmark (linked to the market) as a reference portfolio (given correlation or copula with a stochastic benchmark).
- Improved upper bounds on Sharpe ratios useful for example for fraud detection. For example it is shown that under some conditions it is not possible for investment funds to display negative correlation with the financial market and to have a positive Sharpe ratio.
- Related problems can be solved: case of multiple benchmarks...

Related problems

▶ Able to solve the partial hedging problem:

$$\min_{X_{T}} \mathbb{E} \left[(B_{T} - X_{T})^{2} \right]$$
subject to
$$\begin{cases} \mathbb{E} \left[\xi_{T} B_{T} \right] = W_{0} \\ \mathbb{E} \left[\xi_{T} X_{T} \right] = W (W \leqslant W_{0}) \end{cases}$$

► Able to deal with constrained "cost-efficiency" problems (extend Bernard, Boyle, Vanduffel (2011))

$$\min_{X_{T}} \mathbb{E} \left[\xi_{T} X_{T} \right]$$
subject to
$$\begin{cases} X_{T} \sim F \\ \operatorname{corr}(X_{T}, B_{T}) = \rho \end{cases}$$

Multiple constraints can be dealt with.

Introduction	M-V Efficiency	Fraud	Correlation	GOP	Fraud	Copula	Fraud	Conclusion
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