Ambiguity Aversion in Real Options:

6th World Congress of the Bachelier Finance Society

Sebastian Jaimungal sebastian.jaimungal@utoronto.ca

Department of Statistics and Mathematical Finance Program, University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada http://www.utstat.utoronto.ca/sjaimung

June 22-26, 2010

The Real Option Problem

Classical work of McDonald & Siegel (86) assigns the value

$$f_t = \mathbb{E}_t \left[e^{-
ho(T-t)} \left(\mathbf{P}_{\mathsf{T}} - I
ight)_+
ight]$$

to the **option to invest** in a project at T

- P_t value of a project if invested in at time t
- I the cost of the investment
- ρ discount rate

▶ If early investment is allowed (e.g. qrtly or mthly), then

$$f_t = \sup_{\tau \in \mathscr{T}} \mathbb{E}_t \left[e^{-\rho(\tau - t)} \left(\mathbf{P}_{\tau} - I \right)_+ \right]$$

• \mathscr{T} – a set of admissible stopping times

The Real Option Problem

- $\blacktriangleright\ P_t$ often assumed spanned by a traded asset mostly unrealistic
 - Spanning allows the project to effectively be traded and therefore valued using discounted expectations
- Instead view Pt as strongly correlated to a tradable asset St
- Two key questions addressed here:
 - How to value the option on P_t by trading in S_t ?
 - ► Will use Utility indifference pricing
 - ▶ Henderson & Hobson (02) and Henderson (07) for perpetual version
 - An agent may have a good model for S_t but not P_t... how to account for this ambiguity?
 - ► Knightian Uncertainty / ambiguity aversion
 - Robustness Approach: Anderson, Hansen, & Sargent (99); Uppal & Wang (03); Maenhout (04); and J. & Sigloch (09)
 - Recursive multiple priors: Epstein & Wang (94) Chen & Epstein (02) extension of Gilboa & Schmeidler (89)

- Consider:
 - Suppose want to value the risk Y received at T
 - Agent's utility is exponential $u(x) = -\frac{1}{\gamma}e^{-\gamma x}$
 - Agent's initial wealth is x and risk-free rate is r
- Basic utility indifference valuation:
 - 1. Invest all of x in bank account:

$$V(x) = -\frac{1}{\gamma} e^{-\gamma \times e^{rT}}$$

2. Invest x - v in bank account and receive Y at T:

$$U(x) = \mathbb{E}[u((x-v)e^{r^{T}} + \mathbf{Y})] = V(x-v)\mathbb{E}[e^{-\gamma \mathbf{Y}}]$$

3. Indifference value v solves

$$V(x) = U(x) \quad \Rightarrow \quad v = -\frac{1}{\gamma} e^{-rT} \ln \mathbb{E}[e^{-\gamma \mathbf{Y}}]$$

Invest optimally in S_t without option to invest in project

$$U(x) = \sup_{\pi \in \mathcal{A}} \mathbb{E}\left[u(\mathbf{X}_{\mathsf{T}})\right]$$

- classical Merton (69) problem, admits explicit solution
- Invest optimally in S_t with option to invest in project
 - Upon exercise, receive option value, and revert to Merton:

$$U(x, P; a) = \sup_{\tau \in \mathscr{T}} \sup_{\pi \in \mathscr{A}} \mathbb{E} \left[V(\tau, \mathbf{X}_{\tau} + a (\mathbf{P}_{\tau} - \mathbf{I})_{+}) \right]$$

$$V(t,x) = \sup_{\pi \in \mathcal{A}} \mathbb{E}\left[u(\mathbf{X}_{\mathsf{T}}) | X_t = x\right]$$

▶ Henderson (07) solved the perpetual version of this problem



Indifference value v of option to invest in project defined as

 $U(x, \mathbf{P}; 0) = U(x - \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{P}; 1)$

 \blacktriangleright Non-traded project value P_t and correlated traded equity \textbf{S}_t satisfy

$$d\mathbf{P_t} = \mathbf{P_t} \left(\nu dt + \eta dW_t^P \right) \ , \quad d\mathbf{S_t} = \mathbf{S_t} \left(\mu dt + \sigma dW_t^S \right)$$

with $d[W^P, W^S]_t = \rho dt$.

For risk-neutral valuation can use the minimal entropy martingale measure:

$$d\mathbf{P}_{t} = \mathbf{P}_{t} \left(\hat{\nu} dt + \eta d \hat{W}_{t}^{P} \right) , \quad d\mathbf{S}_{t} = \mathbf{S}_{t} \left(r dt + \sigma d \hat{W}_{t}^{S} \right)$$

with $\hat{\nu} = \nu - \rho \eta \frac{\mu - r}{\sigma}$ and $d[\hat{W}^P, \hat{W}^S]_t = \rho dt$

- The MEMM appears in indifference valuation as well
- Ambiguity adjusted MEMM appears for ambiguity-averse agents

- Let X_t denote the investor's wealth
- Let π_t denote the **dollar amount invested** in the tradable asset S_t
- Let \mathcal{A} denote the set of admissible strategies

$$\mathcal{A} = \left\{ \pi_{\mathsf{t.}} | \mathsf{self financing and } \int_0^T {\pi_{\mathsf{ts}}^2 ds} < +\infty
ight\}$$

Self-financing strategies imply

$$d\mathbf{X}_{t} = ((\mu - r)\pi_{t} + r\,\mathbf{X}_{t})dt + \sigma\pi_{t}\,dW_{t}^{S}$$

Dynamic programming principle leads to the HJB eqn

$$\begin{cases} \partial_t U + \max_{\pi} \mathcal{L}_{\pi} U = 0\\ U(t, b(x), P; a) = V(t, x + a(P - I)_+) \end{cases}$$



► Assume exp. utility: $u(x) = -\frac{1}{\gamma}e^{-\gamma x}$ then wealth factors:

$$V(t,x) = u\left(x e^{r(T-t)}\right) e^{-\frac{1}{2}\lambda^2(T-t)}$$
$$U(t,x,e^y) = V(t,x) G^\beta(t,y)$$

where $\lambda = (\mu - r)/\sigma$ is the market price of risk and $\beta = (1 - \rho^2)^{-1}$ is the power transform coefficient

• G solves a linear complementarity problem

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{rl} \partial_t G + \mathcal{L}G & \leq 0, \\ \ln G(t,y) & \geq h(t,y), \\ (\partial_t G + \mathcal{L}G) \cdot (\ln G(t,y) - h(t,y)) & = 0, \end{array} \right.$$

where

$$h(t,y) = a rac{\gamma}{eta} (e^y - K)_+ e^{r(T-t)}, \qquad ext{and}, \quad \mathcal{L} = \hat{
u} \partial_y + rac{1}{2} \eta^2 \partial_{yy}$$

• Since wealth factors, the **indifference value** is simply:

$$\mathbf{v}(\mathbf{t},\mathbf{y}) = \frac{\beta}{\gamma} e^{-r(T-t)} \ln G(t,y)$$

▶ v(t, y) then satisfies a <u>non-linear</u> complementarity problem:

$$\begin{cases} \partial_t v + \mathcal{L}v - \frac{1}{2}\eta^2 \frac{\gamma}{\beta} e^{r(T-t)} (\partial_y \mathbf{v})^2 &\leq r v, \\ v(t,y) &\geq (e^y - K)_+, \\ \left(\partial_t v + \mathcal{L}v - \frac{1}{2}\eta^2 \frac{\gamma}{\beta} e^{r(T-t)} (\partial_y v)^2 - r v\right) \\ \cdot (v(t,y) - (e^y - K)_+) &= 0. \end{cases}$$

- As $\gamma \downarrow 0$, the non-linearity disappears
- Recovers the risk-neutral American option price

The effect of risk-aversion on exercise policy



The effect of risk-aversion on option value



- Agent's may lack confidence in their model and this uncertainty affects decisions
- As illustrated in the classical Ellsberg paradox
 - You are given 40 red marbles; and a total of 60 black and green marbles
 - Mix all marbles, 1 chosen at random
 - Most investors prefer A to B

A	В
receive \$100 if red	receive \$100 if black

Most investors prefer D to C

C	D
receive \$100 if red or green	receive \$100 if black or green

- Inconsistent with maximizing expected utility
- Resolved through including ambiguity aversion

- Agent's may lack confidence in their model
 - Knightian Uncertainty viewed as ambiguity aversion
- Use ideas from Robust Portfolio Optimization
 - \blacktriangleright Agent has some confidence in a reference measure $\mathbb P$
 - Agent is willing to consider a class of candidate measures Q
 - Agent then solves the problem

$$V(x, P, S) = \sup_{\pi \in \mathcal{A}} \inf_{\mathbb{Q} \in \mathcal{Q}} \mathbb{E}^{\mathbb{Q}}_{x, P, S} \left[u(X^{\pi}_{T}) + \frac{1}{\varepsilon} h(\mathbb{Q}|\mathbb{P}) \right]$$

- ▶ h(Q|P)is a penalty function... e.g. relative entropy
- \blacktriangleright The parameter ε acts as a measure of ambiguity aversion
 - As $\varepsilon \downarrow 0$ reference measure is picked out
 - $\varepsilon \uparrow +\infty$ all candidates measures are equal

- For relative entropy: $h(\mathbb{Q}|\mathbb{P}) = \mathbb{E}^{\mathbb{Q}}[\ln \frac{d\mathbb{Q}}{d\mathbb{P}}] = \mathbb{E}^{\mathbb{Q}}[\int_{0}^{\tau} \mu'_{s} \Sigma^{-1} \mu_{s} ds]$
- ▶ Instead use scaled relative entropy similar to in J. & Sigloch (09):

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{U}^{\mathbf{a}}(\mathbf{t},\mathbf{x},\mathbf{P},\mathbf{S}) &= \sup_{\tau \in \mathscr{T}_{t}} \sup_{\pi \in \mathcal{A}} \inf_{\mathbb{Q} \in \mathscr{Q}} \mathbb{E} \left[V(\widehat{\tau}, X_{\widehat{\tau}}^{\pi} + a(P_{\widehat{\tau}} - I)_{+}, P_{\widehat{\tau}}, S_{\widehat{\tau}}) \right. \\ &\left. - \frac{1}{\epsilon} \int_{t}^{\widehat{\tau}} \mathbf{U}^{\mathbf{a}}(\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{X}_{\mathbf{s}}^{\pi}, \mathbf{P}_{\mathbf{s}}, \mathbf{S}_{\mathbf{s}}) \mu_{\mathbf{s}}^{\mathbb{Q}'} \mathbf{\Sigma}^{-1} \mu_{\mathbf{s}}^{\mathbb{Q}} ds \right], \end{aligned}$$

where, $\widehat{\tau} = \tau \wedge \mathbf{T}$ and

$$\mathbf{V}(\mathbf{t}, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{P}, \mathbf{S}) = \sup_{\pi \in \mathcal{A}} \inf_{\mathbb{Q} \in \mathcal{Q}} \mathbb{E} \left[u(X_T^{\pi}) - \frac{1}{\epsilon} \int_t^T \mathbf{V}(\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{X}_{\mathbf{s}}^{\pi}, \mathbf{P}_{\mathbf{s}}, \mathbf{S}_{\mathbf{s}}) \mathbf{v}_{\mathbf{s}}^{\mathbb{Q}'} \mathbf{\Sigma}^{-1} \mu_{\mathbf{s}}^{\mathbb{Q}} ds \right].$$

► The Dynamic programming principle leads to the HJB eqn

$$\begin{cases} \partial_t U + \max_{\pi,\mu} \left(\mathcal{L}_{\pi,\mu} U - \frac{1}{\varepsilon} \mu' \Sigma^{-1} \mu U \right) = 0 \\ U(t, b(x), P; \mathbf{a}) = V(t, x + \mathbf{a}(P - I)_+) \\ \partial_t V + \max_{\pi,\mu} \left(\mathcal{L}_{\pi,\mu} V - \frac{1}{\varepsilon} \mu' \Sigma^{-1} \mu V \right) = 0 \\ V(T, x) = u(x) \end{cases}$$

The scaling of relative entropy allows explicit solutions the DPE

Equations are similar to previous case with modified parameters

The ansatz

$$V(t,x) = u\left(x e^{r(T-t)}\right) e^{-\frac{1}{2}\lambda^2(T-t)}, \quad U(t,x,e^y) = V(t,x) G^{\beta}(t,y)$$

solves the resulting dynamic programming equations

- ► $\lambda^2 = \frac{1}{1+\varepsilon} \left(\frac{\mu-r}{\sigma}\right)$ is ambiguity adjusted market price of risk
- \blacktriangleright The power transform coefficient β also depends on the ambiguity aversion parameter
- ► indifference value $\mathbf{v}(\mathbf{t}, \mathbf{y}) = \frac{\beta}{\gamma} e^{-r(T-t)} \ln G(t, y)$ solves a non-linear complimentary problem

$$\begin{array}{rcl} \partial_t v + \mathcal{L}_{\varepsilon} \mathbf{v} - \frac{1}{2} \eta^2 \frac{\gamma}{\beta} e^{r(T-t)} (\partial_y \mathbf{v})^2 &\leq r \, v, \\ v(t,y) &\geq (e^y - K)_+, \\ \left(\partial_t v + \mathcal{L}_{\varepsilon} \mathbf{v} - \frac{1}{2} \eta^2 \frac{\gamma}{\beta} e^{r(T-t)} (\partial_y v)^2 - r \, v \right) \\ \cdot (v(t,y) - (e^y - K)_+) &= 0. \end{array}$$

The effect of ambiguity-aversion on exercise boundary



The effect of ambiguity-aversion on option price



- Ambiguity and Risk aversion are similar but distinct
- As γ↓0 non-linearity in LC problem is removed but dependence on ε remains through the ambiguity adjusted MEMM drift

$$\hat{\nu} = \nu - \frac{1}{1+\varepsilon}\rho\eta \frac{\mu - r}{\sigma}$$

- As $\varepsilon \downarrow 0$, $\hat{\nu}$ decreases to MEMM drift
- As $\varepsilon \uparrow +\infty$, $\hat{\nu}$ increases to ν reference measure drift
- An agent may be risk-neutral but severely ambiguity averse

Conclusions

- Project value modeled as non-traded asset
- Correlated traded asset provides partial hedge
- Use utility indifference to value option
- Risk-aversion affects option value and exercise strategy in non-linear way
- Ambiguity aversion can be incorporated trough a scaled entropic penalty
- Ambiguity also affects option value and exercise strategy in non-linear way
- Ambiguity and risk aversion are similar but distinct factors in explaining agent's behavior

Conclusion

Thank you for your attention!!

Sebastian Jaimungal

sebastian.jaimungal@utoronto.ca University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada

http://www.utstat.utoronto.ca/sjaimung