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# On the relative pricing of long maturity S&P 500 index options and CDX tranches

#### Pierre Collin-Dufresne Robert Goldstein Fan Yang

Bachelier World Congress: June 2010

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## Securitized Credit Markets Crisis

- Pre-crisis saw large growth in securitized credit markets (CDO).
- Pooling and tranching used to create 'virtually risk-free' AAA securities, in response to high demand for highly rated securities.
- During the crisis all AAA markets were hit hard:
  - Home equity loan CDO prices fell (ABX.HE AAA < 60%).</li>
  - Super Senior (30-100) tranche spreads > 100bps.
  - CMBX.AAA (super duper) >750bps.
- Raises several questions:
  - Q? Were ratings incorrect (ex-ante default probability higher than expected)?
  - Q? Are ratings sufficient statistics (risk  $\neq$  expected loss)?
  - Q? Were AAA tranches mis-priced (relative to option prices)?
- Many other surprises:
  - Corporate Credit spreads widened (CDX-IG > 200bps).
  - Cash-CDS basis negative (-200 bps for IG; -700bps for HY).
  - LIBOR-Treasury and LIBOR-OIS widened (> 400bps).
  - Long term Swap spreads became negative (30 year swap over Treasury < -50 bps).
  - Defaults on the rise (Bear Stearns, Lehman).

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### Evidence from ABX markets

► ABX.HE (subprime) AAA and BBB spreads widened dramatically (prices dropped)

J.P.Morgan DataQuery



J.P.Morgan Inc.

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#### Evidence from CMBX markets

> CMBX (commercial real estate) AAA spreads widened even more dramatically

## J.P.Morgan DataQuery




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#### Corporate IG CDX Tranche spreads

#### The impact on tranche prices was dramatic




- Implied correlation on equity tranche hit > 40%
- ▶ Correlation on Super-Senior tranches > 100%(!) with standard recovery assumption
- Relative importance of expected loss in senior tranche versus in equity tranche indicates increased crash risk.

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## Evidence from S&P500 Option markets

Implied volatility index widened dramatically: increased market and crash risk.



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## CDX Index & CDX Tranche Markets

- Credit Default Swaps (CDS)
  - Buyer of protection makes regular (quarterly) payments = CDS spread
  - Seller of protection makes buyer whole if underlying bond defaults
  - CDS spread  $\approx$  corporate bond spread  $(y r_f)$
- CDX Investment Grade (IG) Index
  - portfolio of 125 IG credits
  - Buyer of protection makes regular payments on remaining portfolio notional
  - Seller of protection makes buyer whole at time of each bond default
  - CDX index spread pprox weighted average of CDS spreads
- CDX (IG) Tranches written on same portfolio
  - Associated with standard attachment/detachment points (subordination levels):
    - 0-3% (Equity tranche)
    - 3-7% (Mezzanine tranche)
    - 7-10%
    - 10-15%
    - 15-30% (Senior tranche)
    - 30-100% (Super-senior tranche)
  - Buyer of protection makes regular payments on remaining tranche notional
  - Seller of protection makes buyer whole for each bond default which reduces tranche notional
- > CDS, CDX index spreads determined from marginal default probabilities.
- CDX tranche spreads need entire joint distribution (correlation market).

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#### Relation Between SP500 Index Option Prices and CDX Tranche Spreads

- Given the Arrow-Debreu (or state) prices for every date and every state of nature, one can determine the arbitrage-free price of any (derivative) security
- Given option prices across all strikes (and dates) of SP500 index options, one can back out the A/D prices
  - Breeden and Litzenberger (1978)
- Due to diversification effects of 125 firms composing CDX index, CF's associated with CDX tranche positions closely tied to overall market performance
  - $\Rightarrow\,$  Identifying state prices from option prices should be useful for estimating tranche spreads
- ▶ In practice, strikes typically limited to (70% 130%) of current index levels
- Can we extrapolate state prices from SP500 option prices to price credit derivatives?
  - ▶ Payoffs of most senior tranches associated with losses well below 70% of current levels
  - Need to extrapolate well beyond observable prices

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### Structural/Copula Models of Default

Specify market (S&P500) value dynamics as:

$$\frac{dM}{M} = (r - \delta_M) dt + \sigma_M dz_M^Q$$

Specify firm asset value dynamics via CAPM (market plus idiosyncratic risks):

$$\frac{dA_i}{A_i} = (r - \delta_i) dt + \beta_i \sigma_M dz_M^Q + \sigma_i dz_i^Q$$

Note: total variance is sum of market variance plus idiosyncratic variance

$$\mathbf{v}_i^2 = (\beta_i \sigma_M)^2 + \sigma_i^2$$

• Default occurs if  $A(t) \leq B$  for t < T

From Black/Scholes/Merton, to determine CDS spread, only need to know  $v^2$ 

- To determine CDX index spread on 2 (or 125) identical firms, only need to know  $v^2$
- ▶ Consider insurance contract (~ CDX tranches) that pays iff exactly 1 firm defaults
  - If  $v^2 = (\beta \sigma_M)^2$ , returns perfectly correlated: either zero firms or all firms will default • value of insurance on exactly one default is zero
  - If  $v^2 > (\beta \sigma_M)^2$ , returns are imperfectly correlated: a single default is possible
    - value of insurance on exactly one default is positive

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### Coval, Jurek and Stafford (CJS, 2009)

- ▶ Model Specification (~ standard copula with Option-implied market factor)
  - Estimate 5-year state prices using 5-year SP500 option prices (~ local vol model)
  - Specify idiosyncratic risk as Gaussian diffusion
  - Calibrate model to match the 5-year CDX index spread
    - Have only 5-year state prices; estimating PV[ CF's ] (0-5 years)
- Findings: Observed spreads on
  - equity tranche too high compared to model predictions
  - other tranches (except super-senior) too low compared to model predictions

	0-3%	3-7%	7-10%	10-15%	15-30%	30-100%
data	1472	135	37	17	8	4
CJS	914	267	150	87	28	1

#### Interpretation:

- sellers of insurance on senior tranches naive:
  - focused on high credit ratings/low probability of payout
  - did not properly account for the level of systematic risk exposure

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## Our Approach

- Methodology:
  - Specify several (jump-diffusion-SV) structural model for both market (S&P500) and individual (CDX) firm dynamics.
  - Price options (closed-form) and tranches (Monte-carlo simulations).
  - Calibrate market dynamics to match all maturities and strikes of SP500 options.
  - Calibrate idiosyncratic dynamics to match <u>all maturities</u> of CDX index spreads.
  - Calibrate to beta and total variance (estimated from CRSP/Compustat for constituents of CDX index).
- Main Findings:
  - Spread on super-senior tranche too far out of the money to estimate using option prices
  - Taking Super Senior spreads as input, other tranche spreads well estimated by <u>any</u> model
- Interpretation:
  - sellers of insurance on senior tranches sophisticated:
    - Required fair (relative) compensation for risks involved
    - $\blacktriangleright$  May have enjoyed the "window dressing" associated with highly rated securities ( $\sim$  rating 'arbitrage').

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#### A structural model for pricing long-dated S&P500 options

The market model is the Stochastic Volatility Common Jump (SVCJ) model of Broadie, Chernov, Johannes (2009):

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{dM_t}{M_t} &= (r-\delta) dt + \sqrt{V_t} dw_1^Q + (e^y - 1) dq - \bar{\mu}_y \lambda^Q dt + (e^{y_c} - 1) (dq_c - \lambda_c^Q dt) \\ dV_t &= \kappa_v (\bar{V} - V_t) dt + \sigma_v \sqrt{V_t} (\rho dw_1^Q + \sqrt{1 - \rho^2} dw_2^Q) + y_v dq \\ d\delta_t &= \kappa_\delta (\bar{\delta} - \delta_t) dt + \sigma_\delta \sqrt{V_t} (\rho_1 dw_1^Q + \rho_2 dw_2^Q + \sqrt{1 - \rho_1^2 - \rho_2^2} dw_3^Q) + y_\delta dq. \end{aligned}$$

- ▶ We add stochastic dividend yield (SVDCJ) to help fit long-dated options as well.
- The parameters of the model are calibrated to 5-year index option prices obtained from CJS.
- State variables are extracted given parameters from time-series of short maturity options (obtained from OptionMetrics).
- Advantage of using structural model: Arbitrage-free extrapolation into lower strikes (needed for senior tranches).

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#### A structural model of individual firm's default

• Given market dynamics, we assume individual firm *i* dynamics:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{dA_i(t)}{A_i(t)} + \delta_A dt - rdt &= \beta_i \left( \sqrt{V_t} dw_1^Q + (e^y - 1) dq - \bar{\mu}_y \lambda^Q dt \right) + \sigma_i dw_i \\ &+ (e^{y_c} - 1) \left( dq_c - \lambda_c^Q dt \right) + (e^{y_i} - 1) \left( dq_i - \lambda_i^Q dt \right). \end{aligned}$$

Note

- $\beta$ : exposure to market excess return (i.e., systematic diffusion and jumps).
- *dq<sub>C</sub>*: 'catastrophic' market wide jumps.
- *dq<sub>i</sub>*: idiosyncratic firm specific jumps.
- *dw<sub>i</sub>*: idiosyncratic diffusion risks.

• Default occurs the first time firm value falls below a default barrier  $B_i$  (Black (1976)):

$$\tau_i = \inf\{t : A_i(t) \le B_i\}. \tag{1}$$

• Recovery upon default is a fraction  $(1 - \ell)$  of the remaining asset value.

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#### Pricing of the CDX index via Monte-Carlo

- The running spread on the CDX index is closely related to a weighted average of CDS spreads.
- ▶ Determined such that the present value of the **protection leg**  $(V_{idx,prot})$  equals the PV of the **premium leg**  $(V_{idx,pret})$ :

$$V_{idx,prem}(S) = S E \left[ \sum_{m=1}^{M} e^{-rt_m} (1 - n(t_m)) \Delta + \int_{t_{m-1}}^{t_m} du \, e^{-ru} (u - t_{m-1}) \, dn_u \right]$$
$$V_{idx,prot} = E \left[ \int_0^T e^{-rt} \, dL_t \right].$$

- We have defined:
  - The (percentage) defaulted notional in the portfolio:  $n(t) = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i} \mathbf{1}_{\{\tau_i < t\}}$
  - ► The cumulative (percentage) loss in the portfolio:  $L(t) = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i} \mathbf{1}_{\{\tau_i \leq t\}} (1 R_i(\tau_i))$

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Pricing of the CDX Tranches via Monte-Carlo

The tranche loss as a function of portfolio loss is

$$T_j(L(t)) = \max \left[ L(t) - K_{j-1}, 0 
ight] - \max \left[ L(t) - K_j, 0 
ight].$$

The initial value of the protection leg on tranche-j is

$$Prot_{j}(0,T) = \mathsf{E}^{Q}\left[\int_{0}^{T} e^{-rt} dT_{j}(L(t))\right]$$

For a tranche spread  $S_i$ , the initial value of the premium leg on tranche-*j* is

$$Prem_{j}(0, T) = S_{j} E^{Q} \left[ \sum_{m=1}^{M} e^{-rt_{m}} \int_{t_{m-1}}^{t_{m}} du \left( K_{j} - K_{j-1} - T_{j}(L(u)) \right) \right].$$

Appropriate modifications to the cash-flows

- Equity tranche (upfront payment),
- Super-senior tranche (recovery accounting).

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#### Calibration of firms' asset value processes

- Calibrate 7 (unlevered) asset value parameters  $(\beta, \sigma, B, \lambda_1, \lambda_2, \lambda_3, \lambda_4)$  to match median CDX-series firm's:
  - Market beta
  - Idiosyncratic risk (estimated from rolling regressions for CDX series constituents using CRSP-Compustat)
  - Term structure of CDX spreads (1 to 5 year)
- Set jump size to -2 ( $\sim$  jump to default).
- ▶ When present, calibrate catastrophic jump intensity to match super-senior ( $\lambda_C < 1$  event per 1000 years).
- Set loss given default  $1 \ell$  to 40% ( $\sim$  match historical average) in normal times.
- Set  $1 \ell = 20\%$  if catastrophe jump occurs (~ Altman et al.).
- Market volatility, jump-risk, dividend-yield all estimated from S&P500 option data in previous step.

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### Average tranche spreads predicted for pre-crisis period

- ▶ We report six tranche spreads averaged over the pre-crisis period Sep 04 Sep 07:
  - The historical values;
  - Benchmark model: Catastrophic jumps calibrated to match the super-senior tranche; Idiosyncratic jumps and default boundary calibrated to match the 1 to 5 year CDX index.
  - $\lambda_c^Q = 0$ : No catastrophic jumps; Idiosyncratic jumps and default boundary calibrated to match 1 to 5 year CDX index;
  - λ<sup>Q</sup> = 0: Catastrophic jumps calibrated to match the super-senior tranche; No idiosyncratic jumps; Default boundary calibrated to match only the 5Y CDX index.
  - $\lambda_Q^Q = 0$ ,  $\lambda_Q^Q = 0$ : No catastrophic jumps; No idiosyncratic jumps; Default boundary calibrated to match only the 5Y CDX index;
  - The results reported by CJS

-	0-3%	3-7%	7-10%	10-15%	15-30%	30-100%	0-3% Upfrt
data	1472	135	37	17	8	4	0.34
benchmark	1449	113	25	13	8	4	0.33
$\lambda_c^Q = 0$	1669	133	21	6	1	0	0.40
$\lambda_i^{Q} = 0$	1077	206	70	32	12	4	0.22
$\lambda_{C}^{Q} = 0, \ \lambda_{i}^{Q} = 0$	1184	238	79	31	6	0	0.26
CJS '	914	267	150	87	28	1	na
CJS — Data Benchmark — Data	24.3	6	9.4	17.5	$\infty$	$\infty$	

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#### Interpretation

- Errors are an order of magnitude smaller than those reported by CJS.
- However, model without jumps ( $\lambda_c^Q = 0$ ,  $\lambda_i^Q = 0$ ) generates similar predictions to CJS.
- Why? Problem is two-fold:
  - Backloading of defaults in standard diffusion model:

Average CDA index spreads for different models							
	1 year	2 year	3 year	4 year	5 year		
Data	13	20	28	36	45		
Benchmark	13	20	28	36	45		
$\lambda_{c}^{Q} = 0$	13	20	28	36	45		
$\lambda_i^{Q} = 0$	6	7	16	29	45		
$(\lambda_C^{'Q} = 0, \lambda_i^Q = 0)$	0	3	13	28	45		

Average CDX index spreads for different models

Idiosyncratic jumps generates a five-year loss distribution that is more peaked around the risk-neutral expected losses of 2.4%.
 (loss distribution with λ<sup>Q</sup><sub>c</sub> = 0, λ<sup>Q</sup><sub>i</sub> = 0 has std dev of 2.9%, whereas loss distribution with (λ<sup>Q</sup><sub>i</sub> > 0, λ<sup>Q</sup><sub>c</sub> = 0) has std dev of 1.7%).

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#### More Generally....

- ► We claim that if:
  - ► Take any "reasonable" dynamic model of market returns to match SP500 option prices
  - Specify idiosyncratic dynamics as a diffusion process
  - Calibrate the model to match the 5-year CDX index
- Then model will generate:

Short term credit spreads that are well below observed levels

	Tranche	spreads	similar	to	those	found	by	CJS
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	1 year	2 year	3 year	4 year	5 year
data	13	20	28	36	45
E <sup>Q</sup> [#def]	0.27	0.83	1.75	3.00	4.69
our model	0	3	13	28	45
SVCJ	0	3	14	29	45
Heston	0	2	12	28	45
E <sup>Q</sup> [#def]	0.01	0.13	0.81	2.33	4.69

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#### More Generally....

- ▶ We claim that if:
  - ► Take any "reasonable" dynamic model of market returns to match SP500 option prices
  - Specify idiosyncratic dynamics as a diffusion process
  - Calibrate the model to match the 5-year CDX index
- Then model will generate:
  - Short term credit spreads that are well below observed levels
  - Tranche spreads similar to those found by CJS

	0-3% Upfrt	0-3%	3-7%	7-10%	10-15%	15-30%	30-100%
data	0.34	1472	135	37	17	8	4
our model	0.26	1184	238	79	31	6	0
SVCJ	0.22	1078	243	96	44	11	0
Heston	0.23	1097	230	83	39	10	0
CJS	na	914	267	150	87	28	1

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## Intuition for Findings

- > Diffusion-based structural models can't explain short maturity spreads for IG debt
  - Some level of jumps captured in market dynamics implied from options
  - However, most risk at individual firm level is idiosyncratic
    - Need to specify idiosyncratic dynamics with jumps to capture short term spreads
- ▶ By calibrating model to 5Y CDX index, all models agree on 5Y expected loss
- > By calibrating model to observed term structure of spreads, defaults occur earlier
  - eliminate "backloading" of defaults
  - crucial for pricing equity tranche spreads
    - $\blacktriangleright\,$  first default associated with  $\approx 16\%$  drop in insurance premium payments
    - timing of defaults so crucial that equity tranche typically priced with an up-front premium
  - > Agents willing to pay more initially if future payments expected to drop more quickly
  - "Backloading" biases equity tranche spreads downward
  - Downward bias on equity tranche generates an upward bias on senior tranches
- In addition, calibrating model to short maturity spreads increases proportion of idiosyncratic risk to systematic risk
  - Tends to make loss distribution more peaked
  - ► Also tends to increase spreads on equity tranche/decrease spreads on senior tranches

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### Calibrating Model to Term Structure of CDX Index Spreads


- When models are calibrated to match short term credit spreads, the results of CJS disappear, and sometimes are even reversed!!
- Predicted super-senior tranche spreads  $\approx 0$

	0-3% Upfrt	0-3%	3-7%	7-10%	10-15%	15-30%	30-100%
data	0.34	1472	135	37	17	8	4
our model SVCJ	0.40 0.35	1669 1505	133 166	21 45	6 19	1 4	0 0
Heston	0.34	1500	157	42	18	5	0

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## Calibrating Model to Term Structure of CDX Index Spreads and SS Spread

- However, can add a "catastrophic jump" to market dynamics
  - Rietz (1988), Barro (2006)
  - has negligible impact on observed option prices
  - has large impact on SS spreads.



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### Calibrating Model to Term Structure of CDX Index Spreads and SS Spread


- However, can add a "catastrophic jump" to market dynamics
  - Rietz (1988), Barro (2006)
  - has negligible impact on observed option prices
  - has large impact on SS spreads.
  - Can improve fit further by taking tranche spreads in-sample
    - Mortensen (2006), Longstaff and Rajan (2008), Eckner (2009)

	0-3% Upfrt	0-3%	3-7%	7-10%	10-15%	15-30%	30-100%
data	0.34	1472	135	37	17	8	4
our model	0.33	1449	113	25	13	8	4
SVCJ	0.30	1330	138	47	26	12	
Heston	0.29	1301	142	46	24	12	4
CJS	na	914	267	150	87	28	1

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#### Time Series Performance

Model fits data well, both pre-crisis and crisis periods



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
#### Conclusion

- ► CF's associated with CDX tranche spreads occur throughout 5 year horizon
  - need dynamic model of market and idiosyncratic dynamics to price consistently
- Market dynamics (mostly) extracted from option prices
- idiosyncratic dynamics extracted from term structure of credit spreads
  - need idiosyncratic jumps to explain short maturity spreads
- without these jumps:
  - default events are "backloaded"
  - ratio of idiosyncratic to market risk is off
    - CDX equity tranche spreads biased downward
    - CDX senior tranche spreads biased upward
- Super senior tranche spreads cannot be estimated via extrapolation
  - Instead, need to take them as input
  - Other tranche spreads well-predicted by <u>any</u> model that also matches option prices, CDS spreads
- Calibrating model to term structure of credit spreads imposes <u>more</u> structure/ less freedom
  - We used "HJM approach"
    - More consistently, can add state variables driving idiosyncratic jump processes

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#### Are senior tranches priced inefficiently by naive investors?

- Investors care only about expected losses (~ ratings) and not about covariance (ironic since they trade in correlation markets!).
- $\Rightarrow$  Spreads across AAA assets should be equalized. Are they?



 $\Rightarrow$  All spreads should converge to **Physical** measure expected loss.

- We observe large risk-premium across the board  $(\lambda^Q/\lambda^P > 6.)$
- Large time-variation in that risk-premium.

 $\Rightarrow$  Time-variation in spreads should be similar to that of rating changes (smoother?).

 Evidence seems inconsistent with marginal price setters caring only about expected loss (~ ratings).

#### What drives differences between structured AAA spreads?

- 'Reaching for yield' by rating constrained investors who want to take more risk because their incentives (limited liability) and can because ratings simply do not reflect risk and/or expected loss.
- Taking more risk by loading on systematic risk was the name of the game (agency conflicts).
- Possible that excess 'liquidity'/leverage lead to spreads being 'too' narrow in all markets, but little evidence that markets were ex-ante mis-priced on a relative basis.
- Ex-post (during the crisis) other issues, such as availability of collateral and funding costs, seem more relevant to explain cross-section of spreads across markets.
- Indeed, how to explain negative and persistent:
  - swap spreads?
  - cds basis?