A general optimal stopping game with applications in finance

W. Zhou/HKU (joint work with S. P. Yung/HKU and Phillip Yam/PolyU)

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W. Zhou/HKU (joint work with S. P. Yung/A general optimal stopping game with applications in Tame 2010 1 / 33

- Motivations: game call options and callable stock loans
- Formulation of a general optimal stopping game
- Solutions: perpetual case
- Solutions: finite time horizon

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Assuming a Black-Scholes market:

 \bullet A risk free bond B with a constant riskless interest rate r,

$$
dB_t = rB_t dt,
$$

 \bullet A stock with price process S, which under the risk neutral measure is governed by

$$
dS_t = (r - d) S_t dt + \kappa S_t dW_t,
$$

where the interest rate $r \geq 0$, the dividend $d \geq 0$ and the volatility *κ* > 0 are constants and W is a one-dimensional Brownian motion on a filtered probability space $(\Omega, \mathcal{F}, \{\mathcal{F}_t\}_{t\ge0}$, $\mathbb{Q})$ with $\mathcal{W}_0 = 0$ almost surely.

At time 0 the option holder pays a premium to the option writer and at any time t (before maturity) both the holder and the writer have the right to exercise the option. If the holder exercises the option at time t, he would claim the amount

$$
Y_t = (S_t - K)^+
$$

with strike price K . If the option writer exercises (or cancells) at time t , he is obliged to pay the holder the amount

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What is the no arbitrage initial price for game call options?

- Initiated by Dynkin (1969) and later reformulated by Neveu (1975) to a more general set up.
- Game option by Kifer (2000).
- Kyprianou (2004): Perpetual game put options on stock without dividend payment:
	- When penalty is large: option writer should never exercise (cancel) the contract;
	- When penalty is small: exercising region for option writer is $\{K\}$.
- Kyprianou (2007): Finite game put options on stock without dividend payment.
- Kunita and Seko (2004): Finite game call options on stock paying dividend.

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	- paying the lender the principal amount and the loan interest, which is equal to Le*γ*^t and hence redeeming his share of stock, or
	- **•** surrendering the stock to the bank.
- The payoff of the client is $Y_t = \left(S_t L e^{\gamma t} \right)^{+}$ when he terminate the contract at time t.

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- Products with similar structure are traded on the financial markets under the name "callable repo".

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- **o** initial value of callable stock loans: smallest initial capital for the lender of the loan to superhedge his position.
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- **o** initial value of callable stock loans: smallest initial capital for the lender of the loan to superhedge his position.
- \bullet The rational value of L and m should be such that the initial value of the callable stock loan is $(S_0 - L + m)$.
- What is the rationale values of L and m?

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- Perpetual stock loans under Jump risk (Cai.N (2009))

• Let X be a process under the risk neutral measure Q_x satisfying

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dX_t = (\rho - d) X_t dt + \kappa X_t dW_t, X_0 = x.
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Then the infinitesimal generator of the process $\left(e^{-\rho t}X_t\right)_{0\leq t<\infty}$ is given by

$$
\mathcal{A} \triangleq \frac{\kappa^2}{2} x^2 \frac{d^2}{dx^2} + (\rho - d) x \frac{d}{dx} - \rho.
$$
 (1)

A pereptual optimal stopping game

o Define

$$
g_1(x) \triangleq (x - q)^+
$$
, $g_2(x) \triangleq max(x - q + c, \theta c)^+$

and

$$
R_{s,t} \triangleq g_1\left(X_t\right) \mathbf{1}_{\{t\leq s\}} + g_2\left(X_t\right) \mathbf{1}_{\{s
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Problem

Find a function v and a pair of stopping times (σ^*, τ^*) such that the following holds

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v(x) = \sup_{\tau \geq 0} \inf_{\sigma \geq 0} \mathbb{E}_x \left[e^{-\rho \sigma \wedge \tau} R_{\sigma, \tau} \right]
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 $\theta = 1$ $\theta = 1$ $\theta = 1$: game call optio[ns](#page-31-0); $\theta = 0$: callable s[toc](#page-29-0)[k](#page-31-0) [lo](#page-27-0)ans[.](#page-27-0)

• Let $\lambda_1 > \lambda_2$ to be the roots of the quadratic equations

$$
\frac{\kappa^2}{2}\lambda^2 + \left(\rho - d - \frac{\kappa^2}{2}\right)\lambda - \rho = 0.
$$

and deÖne

$$
\lambda^* \triangleq \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} 1 & \text{if } d = 0 \text{ and } \rho \geq -\frac{\kappa^2}{2} \\ \frac{(\lambda_1 - 1)^{\lambda_1 - 1}}{\lambda_1^{\lambda_1}} < 1 & \text{if } d > 0 \text{, or } d = 0 \text{ and } \rho < -\frac{\kappa^2}{2} \end{array} \right.
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When $\theta c \geq \lambda^* q^{1-\lambda_1} \left(q-c+\theta c\right)^{\lambda_1}$

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	- it is never optimal for the option seller to stop.
- When $\theta=1$, the condition becomes $c\geq \lambda^*q$, i.e. the penalty is too large.
- \bullet \bullet \bullet The explicit form of v in this case was give[n i](#page-35-0)[n](#page-37-0) [X](#page-30-0)[i](#page-31-0)[a](#page-36-0) [a](#page-37-0)[n](#page-30-0)[d](#page-31-0)[Z](#page-37-0)[h](#page-0-0)[o](#page-1-0)u ([2](#page-0-0)[007](#page-85-0)).

• Consider
$$
\theta c < \lambda^* q^{1-\lambda_1} (q - c + \theta c)^{\lambda_1}
$$
.

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D_2 = \{x : v(x) = g_2(x)\};
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D_2 = \{x : v(x) = g_2(x)\};
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- Exercising region for option holder:

$$
D_1 = \{x : v(x) = g_1(x)\}.
$$

• Take $\theta = 0$ as a example (the case of callable stock loan):

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g_1(x) = (x - q)^{+}
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, $g_2(x) = (x - q + c)^{+}$

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An observation:

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g_1(x) = g_2(x) = 0
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 for $x \le q - c$.

This implies

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v(x) = 0 \text{ for } x \leq q - c
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and hence

$$
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• This reflects the fact that $q - c$ is the amount of the loan that the bank can at least get.

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• Case 1: $\rho \geq 0$ and $d = 0$.

$$
v\left(x\right) =g_{2}\left(x\right) ,
$$

and

$$
D_2=(0,\infty), D_1=(0,q-c]
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• In this case,

$$
\mathcal{A}\mathcal{g}_i\geq 0 \text{ for } i=1,2.
$$

The bank exercises immediately; while the client don't exercise (as long as $X_t > q - c$):

• Case 2: $\rho < 0$ or $d > 0$

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- Intuitively the client should stop as long as X is large enough.

- Case 2: *ρ* < 0 or d > 0
- Intuitively the client should stop as long as X is large enough.
- For the bank, when (i) $\rho < 0$, or (ii) $\rho = 0$ and $d > 0$, or (iii) $\rho > 0$ and $d > \rho > 0$,

$$
\mathcal{A}g_2=-dx+r(q-c)\leq 0 \text{ for } x>q-c.
$$

The bank should wait as long as $X_s > q - c$, i.e.

$$
D_2=(0,q-c]
$$

• In the case $\rho \geq 0$ and $d = 0$,

$$
D_2=\left(0,\infty\right).
$$

In cases (i), (ii) and (iii),

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- **In the remaining case:** $\rho > 0$ and $\rho > d > 0$, we expect D_2 changes continuously in terms of model parameter.
- A critical dividend $\rho>d^*>0$:

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- case (iv) $\rho > 0$ and $\rho > d \ge d^* : D_2 = (0, q c]$;
- case (v) $\rho > 0$ and $d^* > d > 0$: $D_2 = (0, b_1]$ with $b_1 \uparrow \infty$ as $d \downarrow 0$.

Case 2. a): When

 \leftarrow

Case 2. a): When (i) *ρ* < 0 or

 \Box

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	$$
	\rho < 0
	$$
	 or
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	\n\n
\n

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\n- $$
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	\n- (iv) $\rho > 0$ and $\rho > d \ge d^*$,
	\n- $D_2 = (0, q - c], D_1 = (0, q - c] \cup [a_0, \infty)$
	\n\n
\n

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• Plotting the value function:

Figure: Figure 3: Graphical illustration of v with a market model $\rho = 0.03$, $\kappa = 0.15$, $d = 0.025$, $q = 80$ and $c = 16$. In this case $D_2 = (0, q - c) = (0, 64)$.

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Figure: Figure 3: Graphical illustration of v with a market model $\rho = 0.03$, $\kappa = 0.15$, $d = 0.025$, $q = 80$ and $c = 16$. In this case $D_2 = (0, q - c) = (0, 64)$.

• Smooth fit principle fails at the lower boun[da](#page-59-0)r[y](#page-61-0) $q - c$ $q - c$ $q - c$ [.](#page-59-0)

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• $a_0 \triangleq \alpha_0 q$ and α_0 is the unique solution to either of the following equations.

• for the case
$$
d > 0
$$
 or $\rho \neq -\frac{\kappa^2}{2}$,

$$
(1 - \lambda_1) \alpha^{1 - \lambda_2} + \lambda_1 \alpha^{-\lambda_2} = \left(\frac{q - c}{q}\right)^{\lambda_1 - \lambda_2} \left[(1 - \lambda_2) \alpha^{1 - \lambda_1} + \lambda_2 \alpha^{-\lambda_1} \right];
$$

for the case $d = 0$ and $\rho = -\frac{\kappa^2}{2}$ $\frac{c}{2}$,

$$
\alpha - \ln \alpha + \ln \frac{q-c}{q} - 1 = 0.
$$

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• When $\rho > 0$, define

$$
v_B(x) \triangleq \sup_{\tau} \mathbb{E}_x \left[e^{-\rho \tau} g_1 \left(X_{\tau} \right) \mathbf{1}_{\{\tau < \sigma_{q-c} \}} \right]
$$

and

$$
d^{*} \triangleq \inf \left\{ d > 0: \frac{d}{d x} v_{B} \left(\left(q - c \right) + \right) \leq 1 \right\},\,
$$

where $\frac{d}{dx}u((q-c)+1) = \lim_{x \downarrow (q-c+\theta c)} \frac{u(x)}{x-(q-c)}$ $\frac{u(x)}{x-(q-c)}$.

• When $\rho > 0$, define

$$
\mathsf{v}_\mathsf{B}\left(\mathsf{x}\right) \triangleq \sup_{\tau} \mathbb{E}_{\mathsf{x}}\left[e^{-\rho \tau} g_1\left(X_{\tau}\right) \mathbf{1}_{\{\tau < \sigma_{q-c}\}}\right]
$$

and

$$
d^* \triangleq \inf \left\{ d > 0 : \frac{d}{dx} v_B ((q - c) +) \leq 1 \right\},\
$$

where $\frac{d}{dx}u((q-c)+1) = \lim_{x \downarrow (q-c+\theta c)} \frac{u(x)}{x-(q-c)}$ $\frac{u(x)}{x-(q-c)}$.

 \bullet v_B : the price of an American down-and-out call option with strike q and barrier $q - c$.

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- \bullet v_B : the price of an American down-and-out call option with strike q and barrier $q - c$.
- d^* : the smallest dividend such that the delta of the American down-and-out call at the barrier is smaller than unity.

 $\mathsf{Case} \ 2. \ \mathsf{b}$): When $\mathsf{(v)} \ \rho > 0$ and $d^* > d > 0$,

$$
D_2 = (0, b_1]
$$
 and $D_1 = (0, q - c] \cup [a_1, \infty)$.

• Plotting the value function:

Figure: Figure 4: Graphical illustration of v with a market model $\rho = 0.03$, $\kappa = 0.15$, $d = 0.012$, $q = 80$ and $c = 16$. In this case $D_2 = (0, b_1) = (0, 92.77)$.

 \bullet \bullet \bullet Smooth fit principle holds at the lower bou[nd](#page-65-0)[ar](#page-67-0)[y](#page-65-0) b_1 b_1 [.](#page-67-0)

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 $(b_1, a_1) \triangleq (\beta_1 q, \alpha_1 q)$ and (β_1, α_1) is the unique pair of solutions to the system of equations

$$
\begin{cases}\n(1-\lambda_1) \alpha^{1-\lambda_2} + \lambda_1 \alpha^{-\lambda_2} + (\lambda_1 - \lambda_2) \left(\beta^{1-\lambda_2} - \frac{q-c}{q} \beta^{-\lambda_2}\right) \\
= \beta^{\lambda_1 - \lambda_2} \left((1-\lambda_2) \alpha^{1-\lambda_1} + \lambda_2 \alpha^{-\lambda_1}\right), \\
(1-\lambda_1) \beta^{1-\lambda_2} + \lambda_1 \frac{q-c}{q} \beta^{-\lambda_2} + (\lambda_1 - \lambda_2) \left(\alpha^{1-\lambda_2} - \alpha^{-\lambda_2}\right) \\
= \alpha^{\lambda_1 - \lambda_2} \left((1-\lambda_2) \beta^{1-\lambda_1} + \lambda_2 \frac{q-c}{q} \beta^{-\lambda_1}\right).\n\end{cases}
$$

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• Rational value of L and m: consider the case 2.b) $r - \gamma > 0$ and $d < d^*$:

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Applications in finance

- Rational value of L and m: consider the case 2.b) $r \gamma > 0$ and $d < d^*$:
- $X_0 \ge a_1$, i.e. $\frac{L}{X_0} \le \frac{L}{a_1} = \frac{1}{\alpha_1}$, the loan-to-value is too small for the client, and the optimal time to redeem the stock is $\tau_{a_1} = 0$, thus there is actually no physical exchange between the bank and the client.

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- $X_0 \leq b_1$, i.e. $\frac{L}{X_0} \geq \frac{L}{b_1} = \frac{1}{\beta_1}$, the loan-to-value is too large for the bank, and the optimal call time is $\sigma_{b_1} = 0$, which also suggests that there is no exchange between the two parties again.

- Rational value of L and m: consider the case 2.b) $r \gamma > 0$ and $d < d^*$:
- $X_0 \ge a_1$, i.e. $\frac{L}{X_0} \le \frac{L}{a_1} = \frac{1}{\alpha_1}$, the loan-to-value is too small for the client, and the optimal time to redeem the stock is $\tau_{a_1} = 0$, thus there is actually no physical exchange between the bank and the client.
- $X_0 \leq b_1$, i.e. $\frac{L}{X_0} \geq \frac{L}{b_1} = \frac{1}{\beta_1}$, the loan-to-value is too large for the bank, and the optimal call time is $\sigma_{b_1} = 0$, which also suggests that there is no exchange between the two parties again.
- $\bullet X_0 \in (b_1, a_1)$, both parties are willing to carry out the business and the fair fee charged is $m = v(X_0) - X_0 + L$, i.e. the loan is marketable if the loan-to-value ratio lies in $\left(\frac{L}{2}\right)$ $\frac{L}{a_1}$, $\frac{L}{b_1}$ b_1 $=\left(\frac{1}{\alpha}\right)$ $\frac{1}{\alpha_1}$, $\frac{1}{\beta_1}$ *β*1 .

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Problem

Find a function v and a pair of stopping times (σ^*, τ^*) such that the following holds

$$
v(t,x) = \sup_{\tau \leq T-t} \inf_{\sigma \leq T-t} \mathbb{E}_{t,x} \left[e^{-\rho \sigma \wedge \tau} R_{\sigma,\tau} \right]
$$

=
$$
\inf_{\sigma \leq T-t} \sup_{\tau \leq T-t} \mathbb{E}_{t,x} \left[e^{-\rho \sigma \wedge \tau} R_{\sigma,\tau} \right] = \mathbb{E}_{t,x} \left[e^{-\rho \sigma^* \wedge \tau^*} R_{\sigma^*,\tau^*} \right].
$$

When $\theta c \geq \lambda^* q^{1-\lambda_1} \left(q-c+\theta c \right)^{\lambda_1}$, the above problem becomes an optimal stopping problem, it is never for the option writer to stop.

- When $\theta c \geq \lambda^* q^{1-\lambda_1} \left(q-c+\theta c \right)^{\lambda_1}$, the above problem becomes an optimal stopping problem, it is never for the option writer to stop.
- When $\theta c < \lambda^* q^{1-\lambda_1} (q c + \theta c)^{\lambda_1}$,

- When $\theta c \geq \lambda^* q^{1-\lambda_1} \left(q-c+\theta c \right)^{\lambda_1}$, the above problem becomes an optimal stopping problem, it is never for the option writer to stop.
- When $\theta c < \lambda^* q^{1-\lambda_1} (q c + \theta c)^{\lambda_1}$,

• Case 1: $\rho > 0$ and $d = 0$.

$$
v(t,x) = \begin{cases} \frac{\theta c}{q-c+\theta c}x & \text{if } x \leq q-c+\theta c \\ x-q+c & \text{if } x > q-c+\theta c \end{cases}
$$

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- When $\theta c \geq \lambda^* q^{1-\lambda_1} \left(q-c+\theta c \right)^{\lambda_1}$, the above problem becomes an optimal stopping problem, it is never for the option writer to stop.
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• Case 1: $\rho > 0$ and $d = 0$.

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v(t,x) = \begin{cases} \frac{\theta c}{q-c+\theta c}x & \text{if } x \leq q-c+\theta c \\ x-q+c & \text{if } x > q-c+\theta c \end{cases}
$$

• Case 2: $\rho < 0$ or $d > 0$.

.

Take $\theta = 0$ as a example

 \bullet In case 2.a)

Plotting of optimal stopping boudaries in a market model with $\rho = -0.03$, $\kappa = 0.15$, $d = 0$, $q = 100$, $c = 16$ and $T = 20$.

Consider $\theta = 0$ and case 2.a)

 $b^*\left(t\right) \equiv \pi L$ and $a^*\left(t\right) = a_0\left(t\right)$ is the unique solution to the integral equation

$$
I(t, a(t)) = a(t) - L + \int_0^{T-t} K_1(t, a(t), s, a(t+s)) ds
$$

with terminal condition $a(T) = L$ if $\widetilde{r} < 0$ or $d \geq \widetilde{r}$ and $a(T) = \frac{\widetilde{r}}{d}L$ otherwise, where

$$
I(t, x) = \mathbb{E}_{t, x} \left[e^{-\tilde{r}(T-t)} (X_T - L)^+ \mathbf{1}_{\{\tau_{\pi L} > T - t\}} \right],
$$

\n
$$
K_1(t, x, s, y) = \mathbb{E}_{t, x} \left[e^{-\tilde{r}s} (-dX_{t+s} + \tilde{r}L) \mathbf{1}_{\{X_{t+s} > y\}} \mathbf{1}_{\{\tau_{\pi L} > s\}} \right],
$$

\nfor $t \in [0, T]$ and $s \in [0, T - t]$.

 \bullet In case 2. b).

Plotting of optimal stopping boundaries in a market model with $ρ = 0.02, d = 0.01, κ = 0.15, d = 0.014, c = 16, q = 100$ and $T = 20$.

The lower boundary is [t](#page-80-0)ime dependent for $t < t^* = 13.3.$ $t < t^* = 13.3.$

Consider $\theta = 0$ and case 2.b)

• Define

$$
v_B\left(s,x\right) \triangleq \sup_{\tau \in \mathcal{T}_{0,u}} \mathbb{E}_x\left[e^{-\rho \tau}\left(X_{\tau}-q\right)^{+} \mathbf{1}_{\left\{\tau \leq \tau_{q-c}\right\}}\right],\tag{2}
$$

and

$$
s^* = \sup \left\{ u > 0 : \frac{d}{dx} v_B \left(s, (q - c) + \right) \leq 1 \right\}.
$$
 (3)

 \leftarrow

Consider $\theta = 0$ and case 2.b)

o Define

$$
v_B\left(s,x\right) \triangleq \sup_{\tau \in \mathcal{T}_{0,u}} \mathbb{E}_x\left[e^{-\rho \tau}\left(X_{\tau}-q\right)^{+} \mathbf{1}_{\left\{\tau \leq \tau_{q-c}\right\}}\right],\tag{2}
$$

and

$$
s^* = \sup \left\{ u > 0 : \frac{d}{dx} v_B \left(s, (q - c) + \right) \leq 1 \right\}.
$$
 (3)

 \bullet v_B (s, x) is the price of a American down and out call option with time to maturity s, strike q and barrier $q - c$.

Consider $\theta = 0$ and case 2.b)

o Define

$$
v_B\left(s,x\right) \triangleq \sup_{\tau \in \mathcal{T}_{0,u}} \mathbb{E}_x\left[e^{-\rho \tau}\left(X_{\tau}-q\right)^{+} \mathbf{1}_{\left\{\tau \leq \tau_{q-c}\right\}}\right],\tag{2}
$$

and

$$
s^* = \sup \left\{ u > 0 : \frac{d}{dx} v_B (s, (q - c) +) \leq 1 \right\}.
$$
 (3)

- \bullet v_B (s, x) is the price of a American down and out call option with time to maturity s, strike q and barrier $q - c$.
- s^* is well-defined and $0 < s^* < \infty$. Define $t^* = (T s^*) \vee 0$.

For $t > t^*$, $b^*(t) \equiv q - c$ and $a^*(t) = a_0(t)$ as in the case 2.a).

 \leftarrow

For $t > t^*$, $b^*(t) \equiv q - c$ and $a^*(t) = a_0(t)$ as in the case 2.a). For $t\leq t^{*}$, $b^{*}\left(t\right) =b_{1}\left(t\right) >q-c$ and $a^{*}\left(t\right) =\alpha_{1}\left(t\right) ,$ where (b_1, a_1) is the unique solution to the system of equations:

 $J(t, a(t)) = a(t) - q + \int_0^{T-t}$ $\begin{array}{cc} K_1\left(t,a\left(t\right),s,a\left(t+s\right)\right)ds \ 0 \end{array}$ $+ \int^{T-t}$ $\begin{array}{ll} K_2 \left(t, a \left(t \right), s, b \left(t + s \right) \right) \textit{d} s \ 0 \end{array}$ $J(t, b(t)) = b(t) - (q - \delta) + \int_0^{T-t}$ $\begin{array}{ll} K_1\left(t,b\left(t\right),s,a\left(t+s\right)\right)$ ds $+ \int_0^{T-t}$ $\mathcal{K}_{2}\left(t,b\left(t\right) ,s,b\left(t+s\right) \right)$ ds

with terminal condition $a_1(t^*) = a_0(t^*)$ and $b_1(t^*) = q - c$.

• The function J and K_2 are defined as

$$
J(t,x) = \mathbb{E}_{t,x} \left[e^{-\widetilde{r}(t^*-t)} u(t^*-t, X_{t^*}) \mathbf{1}_{\{\tau_{\pi L} > t^*-t\}} \right],
$$

\n
$$
K_2(t,x,s,y) = \mathbb{E}_{t,x} \left[e^{-\widetilde{r}s} \left(-dX_{t+s} + \widetilde{r}\pi L \right) \mathbf{1}_{\{X_{t+s} < y\}} \mathbf{1}_{\{\tau_{\pi L} > s\}} \right],
$$

\nfor $t \in [0, t^*]$ and $s \in [0, t^*-t]$.