A general optimal stopping game with applications in finance

W. Zhou/HKU (joint work with S. P. Yung/HKU and Phillip Yam/PolyU)

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- Motivations: game call options and callable stock loans
- Formulation of a general optimal stopping game
- Solutions: perpetual case
- Solutions: finite time horizon

Assuming a Black-Scholes market:

• A risk free bond B with a constant riskless interest rate r,

$$dB_t = rB_t dt$$
,

• A stock with price process S, which under the risk neutral measure is governed by

$$dS_t = (r-d) S_t dt + \kappa S_t dW_t,$$

where the interest rate $r \ge 0$, the dividend $d \ge 0$ and the volatility $\kappa > 0$ are constants and W is a one-dimensional Brownian motion on a filtered probability space $(\Omega, \mathcal{F}, \{\mathcal{F}_t\}_{t\ge 0}, \mathbb{Q})$ with $W_0 = 0$ almost surely.

• At time 0 the option holder pays a premium to the option writer and at any time t (before maturity) both the holder and the writer have the right to exercise the option. If the holder exercises the option at time t, he would claim the amount

$$Y_t = (S_t - K)^+$$

with strike price K. If the option writer exercises (or cancells) at time t, he is obliged to pay the holder the amount

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• What is the no arbitrage initial price for game call options?

- Initiated by Dynkin (1969) and later reformulated by Neveu (1975) to a more general set up.
- Game option by Kifer (2000).
- Kyprianou (2004): Perpetual game put options on stock without dividend payment:
 - When penalty is large: option writer should never exercise (cancel) the contract;
 - When penalty is small: exercising region for option writer is $\{K\}$.
- Kyprianou (2007): Finite game put options on stock without dividend payment.
- Kunita and Seko (2004): Finite game call options on stock paying dividend.

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 - paying the lender the principal amount and the loan interest, which is equal to $Le^{\gamma t}$ and hence redeeming his share of stock, or
 - surrendering the stock to the bank.
- The payoff of the client is $Y_t = (S_t Le^{\gamma t})^+$ when he terminate the contract at time t.

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- Products with similar structure are traded on the financial markets under the name "callable repo".

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- The rational value of L and m should be such that the initial value of the callable stock loan is $(S_0 L + m)$.
- What is the rationale values of L and m?

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- Perpetual stock loans with margin requirements (Ekstrőm and Wanntorp (2009)).
- Perpetual stock loans under Jump risk (Cai.N (2009))

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$$dX_t = (\rho - d) X_t dt + \kappa X_t dW_t, X_0 = x_t$$

• Then the infinitesimal generator of the process $(e^{-\rho t}X_t)_{0 \le t < \infty}$ is given by

$$\mathcal{A} \triangleq \frac{\kappa^2}{2} x^2 \frac{d^2}{dx^2} + (\rho - d) x \frac{d}{dx} - \rho. \tag{1}$$

A pereptual optimal stopping game

Define

$$g_{1}\left(x
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 , $g_{2}\left(x
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$$R_{s,t} \triangleq g_1(X_t) \mathbf{1}_{\{t \leq s\}} + g_2(X_t) \mathbf{1}_{\{s < t\}}.$$

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Problem

Find a function v and a pair of stopping times (σ^*,τ^*) such that the following holds

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{v} \left(x \right) &= \sup_{\tau \geq 0} \inf_{\sigma \geq 0} \mathbb{E}_{x} \left[e^{-\rho \sigma \wedge \tau} R_{\sigma,\tau} \right] \\ &= \inf_{\sigma \geq 0} \sup_{\tau \geq 0} \mathbb{E}_{x} \left[e^{-\rho \sigma \wedge \tau} R_{\sigma,\tau} \right] = \mathbb{E}_{x} \left[e^{-\rho \sigma^{*} \wedge \tau^{*}} R_{\sigma^{*},\tau^{*}} \right]. \end{aligned}$$

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• $\theta = 1$: game call options; $\theta = 0$: callable stock loans.

• Let $\lambda_1 > \lambda_2$ to be the roots of the quadratic equations

$$rac{\kappa^2}{2}\lambda^2 + \left(
ho - d - rac{\kappa^2}{2}
ight)\lambda -
ho = 0.$$

and define

$$\lambda^* \triangleq \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} 1 & \text{if } d = 0 \text{ and } \rho \geq -\frac{\kappa^2}{2} \\ \frac{(\lambda_1 - 1)^{\lambda_1 - 1}}{\lambda_1^{\lambda_1}} < 1 & \text{if } d > 0 \text{, or } d = 0 \text{ and } \rho < -\frac{\kappa^2}{2} \end{array} \right.$$

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 - the optimal stopping game is just an optimal stopping problem
 - it is never optimal for the option seller to stop.
- When heta=1, the condition becomes $c\geq\lambda^*q$, i.e. the penalty is too large.
- The explicit form of v in this case was given in Xia and Zhou (2007).

• Consider
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$$D_{2} = \{x : v(x) = g_{2}(x)\};$$

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- Exercising region for option holder:

$$D_1 = \{x : v(x) = g_1(x)\}.$$

• Take $\theta = 0$ as a example (the case of callable stock loan):

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An observation:

$$g_1(x) = g_2(x) = 0$$
 for $x \leq q - c$.

This implies

$$v\left(x
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and hence

$$(0, q-c] \subset D_2 \cap D_1.$$

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 This reflects the fact that q - c is the amount of the loan that the bank can at least get.

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• Case 1:
$$ho \geq$$
 0 and $d=$ 0.

$$v\left(x
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and

$$D_2=(0,\infty)$$
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In this case,

$$\mathcal{A}g_i \geq 0$$
 for $i = 1, 2$.

The bank exercises immediately; while the client don't exercise (as long as $X_t > q - c$):

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- Intuitively the client should stop as long as X is large enough.
- For the bank, when (i) $\rho < 0$, or (ii) $\rho = 0$ and d > 0, or (iii) $\rho > 0$ and $d \ge \rho > 0$,

$$\mathcal{A}g_2 = -dx + r(q-c) \leq 0$$
 for $x > q-c$.

The bank should wait as long as $X_s > q - c$, i.e.

$$D_2 = (0, q - c].$$

• In the case $ho \geq$ 0 and d= 0,

$$D_2=(0,\infty)$$
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In cases (i), (ii) and (iii),

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- A critical dividend $ho > d^* > 0$:
- case (iv) ho > 0 and $ho > d \geq d^*: D_2 = (0, q-c]$;
- case (v) ho > 0 and $d^* > d > 0$: $D_2 = (0, b_1]$ with $b_1 \uparrow \infty$ as $d \downarrow 0$.

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(iv) $\rho > 0$ and $\rho > d \ge d^*$,
 $D_2 = (0, q - c], D_1 = (0, q - c] \cup [a_0, \infty)$

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Figure: Figure 3: Graphical illustration of v with a market model $\rho = 0.03$, $\kappa = 0.15$, d = 0.025, q = 80 and c = 16. In this case $D_2 = (0, q - c] = (0, 64]$.





Figure: Figure 3: Graphical illustration of v with a market model $\rho = 0.03$, $\kappa = 0.15$, d = 0.025, q = 80 and c = 16. In this case $D_2 = (0, q - c] = (0, 64]$.

• Smooth fit principle fails at the lower boundary q - c.

• $a_0 \triangleq \alpha_0 q$ and α_0 is the unique solution to either of the following equations.

• for the case
$$d>0$$
 or $ho
eq-rac{\kappa^2}{2}$,

$$(1-\lambda_1)\,\alpha^{1-\lambda_2}+\lambda_1\alpha^{-\lambda_2}=\left(\frac{q-c}{q}\right)^{\lambda_1-\lambda_2}\left[(1-\lambda_2)\,\alpha^{1-\lambda_1}+\lambda_2\alpha^{-\lambda_1}\right];$$

• for the case d=0 and $ho=-rac{\kappa^2}{2}$,

$$\alpha - \ln \alpha + \ln \frac{q-c}{q} - 1 = 0.$$

• When ho > 0, define

$$v_{B}(x) \triangleq \sup_{\tau} \mathbb{E}_{x} \left[e^{-\rho \tau} g_{1}(X_{\tau}) \mathbf{1}_{\{\tau < \sigma_{q-c}\}} \right]$$

and

$$d^{st} riangleq \inf \left\{ d > 0 : rac{d}{dx} v_B \left(\left(q - c
ight) +
ight) \leq 1
ight\}$$
 ,

where $\frac{d}{dx}u((q-c)+) = \lim_{x\downarrow(q-c+\theta c)}\frac{u(x)}{x-(q-c)}$.

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 v_B: the price of an American down-and-out call option with strike q and barrier q - c. • When ho > 0, define

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- v_B: the price of an American down-and-out call option with strike q and barrier q - c.
- *d*^{*} : the smallest dividend such that the delta of the American down-and-out call at the barrier is smaller than unity.

Case 2. b): When (v) ho > 0 and $d^* > d > 0$,

$$D_2=(\mathsf{0},b_1]$$
 and $D_1=(\mathsf{0},q-c]\cup[\mathsf{a}_1,\infty)$.



Plotting the value function:

Figure: Figure 4: Graphical illustration of v with a market model $\rho = 0.03$, $\kappa = 0.15$, d = 0.012, q = 80 and c = 16. In this case $D_2 = (0, b_1] = (0, 92.77]$.

• Smooth fit principle holds at the lower boundary b₁.

• $(b_1, a_1) \triangleq (\beta_1 q, \alpha_1 q)$ and (β_1, α_1) is the unique pair of solutions to the system of equations

$$\begin{cases} (1-\lambda_1) \,\alpha^{1-\lambda_2} + \lambda_1 \alpha^{-\lambda_2} + (\lambda_1 - \lambda_2) \left(\beta^{1-\lambda_2} - \frac{q-c}{q}\beta^{-\lambda_2}\right) \\ &= \beta^{\lambda_1 - \lambda_2} \left((1-\lambda_2) \,\alpha^{1-\lambda_1} + \lambda_2 \alpha^{-\lambda_1}\right), \\ (1-\lambda_1) \,\beta^{1-\lambda_2} + \lambda_1 \frac{q-c}{q}\beta^{-\lambda_2} + (\lambda_1 - \lambda_2) \left(\alpha^{1-\lambda_2} - \alpha^{-\lambda_2}\right) \\ &= \alpha^{\lambda_1 - \lambda_2} \left((1-\lambda_2) \,\beta^{1-\lambda_1} + \lambda_2 \frac{q-c}{q}\beta^{-\lambda_1}\right). \end{cases}$$

• Rational value of L and m: consider the case 2.b) $r - \gamma > 0$ and $d < d^*$:

Applications in finance

- Rational value of L and m: consider the case 2.b) $r \gamma > 0$ and $d < d^*$:
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- Rational value of L and m: consider the case 2.b) $r \gamma > 0$ and $d < d^*$:
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- $X_0 \leq b_1$, i.e. $\frac{L}{X_0} \geq \frac{L}{b_1} = \frac{1}{\beta_1}$, the loan-to-value is too large for the bank, and the optimal call time is $\sigma_{b_1} = 0$, which also suggests that there is no exchange between the two parties again.
- X₀ ∈ (b₁, a₁), both parties are willing to carry out the business and the fair fee charged is m = v (X₀) X₀ + L, i.e. the loan is marketable if the loan-to-value ratio lies in (L/a₁, L/b₁) = (1/α₁, 1/β₁).
Problem

Find a function v and a pair of stopping times (σ^*,τ^*) such that the following holds

$$\begin{aligned} v(t,x) &= \sup_{\tau \leq T-t} \inf_{\sigma \leq T-t} \mathbb{E}_{t,x} \left[e^{-\rho \sigma \wedge \tau} R_{\sigma,\tau} \right] \\ &= \inf_{\sigma \leq T-t} \sup_{\tau \leq T-t} \mathbb{E}_{t,x} \left[e^{-\rho \sigma \wedge \tau} R_{\sigma,\tau} \right] = \mathbb{E}_{t,x} \left[e^{-\rho \sigma^* \wedge \tau^*} R_{\sigma^*,\tau^*} \right]. \end{aligned}$$

• When $\theta c \ge \lambda^* q^{1-\lambda_1} (q - c + \theta c)^{\lambda_1}$, the above problem becomes an optimal stopping problem, it is never for the option writer to stop.

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• Case 1: $ho \geq$ 0 and d = 0.

$$v(t,x) = \begin{cases} rac{ heta c}{q-c+ heta c}x & ext{if } x \leq q-c+ heta c \\ x-q+c & ext{if } x > q-c+ heta c \end{cases}$$

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• Case 1: $\rho \geq 0$ and d = 0.

$$\gamma(t,x) = \begin{cases} \frac{\theta c}{q-c+\theta c} x & \text{if } x \le q-c+\theta c \\ x-q+c & \text{if } x > q-c+\theta c \end{cases}$$

• Case 2: $\rho < 0$ or d > 0.

Take $\theta = 0$ as a example

• In case 2.a)



Plotting of optimal stopping boudaries in a market model with $\rho = -0.03$, $\kappa = 0.15$, d = 0, q = 100, c = 16 and T = 20.

Consider $\theta = 0$ and case 2.a)

• $b^{*}(t) \equiv \pi L$ and $a^{*}(t) = a_{0}(t)$ is the unique solution to the integral equation

$$I(t, a(t)) = a(t) - L + \int_{0}^{T-t} K_1(t, a(t), s, a(t+s)) ds$$

with terminal condition a(T) = L if $\tilde{r} < 0$ or $d \ge \tilde{r}$ and $a(T) = \frac{\tilde{r}}{d}L$ otherwise, where

$$I(t,x) = \mathbb{E}_{t,x} \left[e^{-\tilde{r}(T-t)} \left(X_T - L \right)^+ \mathbf{1}_{\{\tau_{\pi L} > T-t\}} \right],$$

$$K_1(t,x,s,y) = \mathbb{E}_{t,x} \left[e^{-\tilde{r}s} \left(-dX_{t+s} + \tilde{r}L \right) \mathbf{1}_{\{X_{t+s} > y\}} \mathbf{1}_{\{\tau_{\pi L} > s\}} \right],$$

for $t \in [0, T]$ and $s \in [0, T - t]$.

• In case 2. b).



Plotting of optimal stopping boundaries in a market model with $\rho = 0.02$, d = 0.01, $\kappa = 0.15$, d = 0.014, c = 16, q = 100 and T = 20.

• The lower boundary is time dependent for $t < t^* = 13.3$.

Consider $\theta = 0$ and case 2.b)

Define

$$v_{B}(s,x) \triangleq \sup_{\tau \in \mathcal{T}_{0,u}} \mathbb{E}_{x} \left[e^{-\rho \tau} \left(X_{\tau} - q \right)^{+} \mathbf{1}_{\{\tau \leq \tau_{q-c}\}} \right], \quad (2)$$

and

$$s^* = \sup\left\{u > 0: \frac{d}{dx}v_B\left(s, \left(q-c\right)+\right) \le 1\right\}.$$
(3)

Consider $\theta = 0$ and case 2.b)

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 v_B (s, x) is the price of a American down and out call option with time to maturity s, strike q and barrier q - c.

Consider $\theta = 0$ and case 2.b)

Define

$$v_{B}(s,x) \triangleq \sup_{\tau \in \mathcal{T}_{0,u}} \mathbb{E}_{x} \left[e^{-\rho \tau} \left(X_{\tau} - q \right)^{+} \mathbf{1}_{\{\tau \leq \tau_{q-c}\}} \right], \quad (2)$$

and

$$s^* = \sup\left\{u > 0: \frac{d}{dx}v_B(s, (q-c)+) \le 1\right\}.$$
 (3)

- v_B (s, x) is the price of a American down and out call option with time to maturity s, strike q and barrier q - c.
- s^* is well-defined and $0 < s^* < \infty$. Define $t^* = (T s^*) \lor 0$.

• For $t > t^*$, $b^*(t) \equiv q - c$ and $a^*(t) = a_0(t)$ as in the case 2.a).

• For $t > t^*$, $b^*(t) \equiv q - c$ and $a^*(t) = a_0(t)$ as in the case 2.a). • For $t \leq t^*$, $b^*(t) = b_1(t) > q - c$ and $a^*(t) = \alpha_1(t)$, where

 (b_1, a_1) is the unique solution to the system of equations:

$$J(t, a(t)) = a(t) - q + \int_0^{T-t} K_1(t, a(t), s, a(t+s)) ds$$

+ $\int_0^{T-t} K_2(t, a(t), s, b(t+s)) ds$
$$J(t, b(t)) = b(t) - (q - \delta) + \int_0^{T-t} K_1(t, b(t), s, a(t+s)) ds$$

+ $\int_0^{T-t} K_2(t, b(t), s, b(t+s)) ds$

with terminal condition $a_1\left(t^*\right) = a_0\left(t^*\right)$ and $b_1\left(t^*\right) = q - c$.

• The function J and K_2 are defined as

$$J(t, x) = \mathbb{E}_{t,x} \left[e^{-\tilde{r}(t^*-t)} u(t^* - t, X_{t^*}) \mathbf{1}_{\{\tau_{\pi L} > t^* - t\}} \right],$$

$$\mathcal{K}_2(t, x, s, y) = \mathbb{E}_{t,x} \left[e^{-\tilde{r}s} \left(-dX_{t+s} + \tilde{r}\pi L \right) \mathbf{1}_{\{X_{t+s} < y\}} \mathbf{1}_{\{\tau_{\pi L} > s\}} \right],$$

for $t \in [0, t^*]$ and $s \in [0, t^* - t].$